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An Overview of TSCA, its History and Key 
Underlying Assumptions, and its Place in 
Environmental Regulation 
David Markell  
INTRODUCTION 
The United States has enacted an alphabet soup of laws during the 
past forty years to try to reduce risks that the manufacture, use, and/or 
disposal of toxic substances pose to our environment and to human 
health.
1
 Creation of this environmental legislative infrastructure has 
had significant effects on American society—on the environment in 
which we and other species live, on the health risks we face, and on 
the work we do.
2
 One of the important early books about toxic 
substances, The Dilemma of Toxic Substances Regulation, suggests 
that this growth in government regulation has ―radically 
 
  Steven M. Goldstein Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. 
Karlie Clemons, Florida State University College of Law ‘09, and Hillary Copeland, Florida 
State University College of Law ‘10, provided terrific research assistance. 
 1. For a list of twenty-one federal laws that focus on a variety of toxic substances, see 
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & 
A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 780, Table 8-2 (5th ed. 
2007). Definitions of ―toxic substances‖ vary. Andrew Hanan, Pushing the Environmental 
Regulatory Focus a Step Back: Controlling the Introduction of New Chemicals under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395 n.1 (1992) (noting that ―[n]o standard 
legal definition of a toxic substance exists‖). The Government Accountability Office (―GAO‖) 
has reviewed several of these statutes. For an example of one multi-program assessment, see 
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA‘S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS 
CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM (2005) [hereinafter GAO June 2005].  
 2. One of the fascinating questions about environmental law relates to its ―appropriate‖ 
scope. At the international level, at least in some circles, there has been considerable rhetoric 
that environmental protection objectives should be viewed in tandem with their impacts on 
economic opportunity under the rubric of ―sustainable development.‖ How the United States 
will navigate its way in defining ―appropriate‖ levels of environmental protection in light of 
other objectives remains a work in progress.  
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transform[ed] the economic roles of government and business as well 
as relations between them.‖3  
As one might expect, there has been an enormous amount of 
debate concerning the nature, extent, and adequacy of this 
transformation. Two overarching questions this rich debate about our 
extensive environmental regulatory infrastructure raises are: Are we 
―there yet‖ in our approach to managing risks from chemicals and, 
related, how will we know?
4
 Further, if we have not reached an 
―optimal‖ level of environmental and human health protection (I 
think it a safe guess that this would be the view of the vast majority 
of readers of this symposium volume), a host of other questions 
require attempts at resolution, including: what remains to be done; 
what are our options for moving forward; what path(s) should we 
take; how should we monitor our progress; and how should we 
structure our approach so we can shift course if and when needed?
5
 In 
the early 1970s, during the most active phase of federal 
environmental law-making this country has ever seen,
6
 the Council 
on Environmental Quality (―CEQ‖) alluded to some of these issues: 
The Nation[‘s voting] overwhelmingly for a cleaner 
environment. . . . has signaled a fundamental redirecting of our 
economy and society. . . . [N]ow, having decided that 
 
 3. JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION ix (1988).  
 4. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 213, 213–21 (2004). The questions of how we should measure progress and, 
related, the metrics we should use to gauge success, are important parts of this debate that 
remain unsettled, though Congress and others have offered guidance on numerous occasions in 
different contexts. See, e.g., Government Performance and Results Act (―GPRA‖) of 1993, Pub. 
L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C, 
39 U.S.C.).  
 5. There are substantial and interesting literatures on each of these questions in the 
context of toxic substances and beyond, including various law review symposia. See, e.g., 
Symposium, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and 
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75 (2008); Symposium, Twenty-Five Years of 
Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 779 (1994); Symposium, New Directions in 
Environmental Policy, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988).  
 6. For example, the CAA was adopted in 1970, the CWA in 1972, RCRA in 1976, and 
TSCA in 1976. National Environmental Policy Act (―NEPA‖) and CERCLA serve as 
legislative bookends for this extraordinary decade of legislative activity in the environmental 
arena. NEPA was adopted in 1969, and CERCLA in 1980. National Environmental Policy Act 
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
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environmental quality is a valuable good, we have to decide 
more precisely how much we want, how we will pay for it, and 
who will pay for it. These questions often require complicated 
analyses involving difficult tradeoffs.
7
  
 Elected officials, regulators, judges, scholars, and a host of others 
have suggested a wide variety of possible guideposts to help inform 
decision-making about these questions. To identify a few, 
formulators and implementers of environmental policy have been 
encouraged to be mindful of the ―precautionary principle‖;8 
―technology forcing‖;9 the notion of ―polluter pays‖;10 ―sustainable 
development‖11 and, perhaps related, the need to consider costs and 
benefits in developing policy approaches;
12
 the importance of 
meaningful public involvement;
13
 the relationship between voluntary 
initiatives and coercive approaches;
14
 whether to differentiate among 
different sources of pollution including, for example, the 
appropriateness of drawing distinctions between ―old‖ and ―new‖ 
sources;
15
 the need for accountability and, related, the use of 
 
 7. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: FOURTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 73 (1973) [hereinafter CEQ 
1973 Report]. 
 8. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 
(June 13, 1992). 
 9. The Clean Air Act (―CAA‖) is an example of a technology-forcing statute, with its 
requirements such as ―best available control technology.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 
(June 13, 1992).  
 11. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 
(June 13, 1992). 
 12. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 
(June 13, 1992). 
 13. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 20–22, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 13, 1992). 
 14. The HPV Challenge Program, discussed infra, is an example of a voluntary program. 
For review of such approaches in the compliance arena, see CLIFF RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID 
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL 
PARTNERSHIP (2003). 
 15. See, e.g., Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program that Can Work, 39 
ELR 10034, 10039–40 (Jan. 2009).  
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―sunlight‖ to create incentives for desired behavior;16 and, in a world 
of limited resources, the value of prioritizing among different 
environmental concerns.
17
 Despite the large literatures on many of 
these concepts, their meaning (and appropriate scope) remains 
somewhat unsettled. Resolution of the questions of if and how these 
different concepts should be considered together in the formulation 
and implementation of environmental policy remains a work in 
progress as well. 
This Article is a very modest attempt to ―tee up‖ some of these 
fundamental questions about the appropriate shape and content of 
environmental law through review of one part of the extraordinarily 
broad and diverse federal legislative infrastructure in place today, 
notably the screening and regulatory program contained in the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (―TSCA‖).18 Congress enacted TSCA in 
1976 because of growing fears about the risks that toxic substances 
posed to human health and the environment.
19
 The Environmental 
Protection Agency (―EPA‖) Administrator at the time, Russell Train, 
 
 16. Justice Brandeis‘s famous quote, ―[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, 
electric light the most efficient policeman.‖ See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE‘S MONEY 
AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 17. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Reducing Risk; CRS Report for Congress: The Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA): Implementation and New Challenges 10–11 (Updated July 18, 2008), 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19946.pdf [hereinafter CRS Report] 
(discussing some of the prioritization efforts under TSCA); Greenwood, supra note 15, at 
10036–37 (discussing the need to do a better job of setting priorities under TSCA, and also 
highlighting the resource constraints EPA faces in implementing TSCA—noting that ―OPPT, 
the implementer of the TSCA program, is one of the most underfunded programs in all of 
EPA‖). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006). My limited task in this symposium issue is to 
provide some contextual background on the development of TSCA and its implementation. I 
completed this Article during the summer of 2009; as a result, it attempts to address some of the 
key developments up to that point in time. In his Article Professor Adelman offers his 
perspective on how TSCA should be reformed to meet contemporary needs. See David E. 
Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL‘Y 377 (2010). 
 19. A great deal of uncertainty underlies our efforts to deal with concerns from toxic 
substances. As the Surgeon General stated in 1980 in reviewing human health effects: ―We 
believe that toxic chemicals are adding to the disease burden of the United States in a 
significant, although as yet not precisely defined, way.‖ GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 
698 (citing S. COMM. ON ENV‘T AND PUB. WORKS, 96TH CONG., HEALTH EFFECTS OF TOXIC 
POLLUTION: A REPORT FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL iii (Comm. Print 1980)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/11
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characterized TSCA as ―‗one of the most important pieces of 
‗preventive medicine‘ legislation‘ ever passed by Congress.‖20 
Congress intended that TSCA be implemented in tandem with 
other statutes covered in this symposium on New Directions in 
Environmental Law, such as the Clean Water Act (―CWA‖) and 
Clean Air Act (―CAA‖), which deal with the release of chemicals 
after their creation.
21
 This symposium covers only a small subset of 
statutes Congress has enacted to address environmental concerns 
stemming from our use of chemicals, as indeed is inevitable given the 
number of such statutes in existence.
22
 Beyond the CWA and CAA, 
there are still other regulatory statutes, such as the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(―CERCLA‖), the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act 
(―RCRA‖), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, that deal with the 
remediation or clean-up of contaminated sites.
23
 There are a host of 
other statutes that take different approaches to advancing 
environmental protection, such as reporting statutes
24
 and statutes that 
focus on pollution prevention.
25
 In enacting TSCA, Congress hoped 
that the statute would add to the toolbox EPA could and would use to 
effectively respond to the risks toxic chemicals pose to our health and 
to the environment; indeed, in Train‘s words, it would be a ―major 
step toward an increasingly effective preventive approach toward the 
 
 20. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Train Sees New Toxic Substances Law as ―Preventive 
Medicine‖ (Oct. 21, 1976), www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/03.htm.  
 21. RCRA, like the CAA and CWA, follows a very prescriptive approach to regulation of 
toxic substances; in the case of RCRA, hazardous wastes. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901–6992 
(2006). These statutes follow a ―standard-setting‖ approach to regulation. MENDELOFF, supra 
note 3, at 6. TSCA‘s purposes have been said to include encouraging EPA to coordinate 
activities of the media-specific statutes. John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: 
Practical Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 724–25 (2008). 
 22. See supra note 2. Federal statutes, in turn, only make up a subset of environmental 
law. State statutes and municipal laws, as well as the common law, all play important roles in 
establishing environmental expectations and norms as well. 
 23. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601–9675 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992; Oil 
and Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2710. 
 24. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, the Toxics Release Inventory program, http://www.epa.gov/TRI/ 
(last visited May 18, 2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–09. For one overview 
of pollution prevention, see David Markell, Pollution Prevention, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 18A (Matthew Bender, 1995). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
338 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 32:333 
 
 
‗environmental disease‘ that has been called the ‗disease of the 
century.‘‖26 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of TSCA and reviews 
some of Congress‘s key underlying assumptions in enacting the 
statute. Part II reviews how things have played out in the 
implementation of some of the key features of TSCA. I conclude with 
a brief review of some of the overarching issues TSCA raises that 
have broader implications for environmental policy.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TSCA AND A REVIEW OF KEY UNDERLYING 
ASSUMPTIONS 
As noted above, Congress enacted TSCA in 1976. Congress‘s 
ultimate purpose in adopting TSCA was to ―prevent unreasonable 
risks of injury to health or the environment associated with the 
manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, or disposal 
of chemical substances.‖27 A 1971 CEQ report, Toxic Substances, 
helped to spawn the effort to develop the legislation that became 
TSCA.
28
 In this seminal early diagnosis of some of the challenges the 
 
 26. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Train Sees New Toxic Substances Law as ―Preventive 
Medicine‖ (Oct. 21, 1976), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/03.htm. In addition to 
raising several of the central issues of environmental policy referenced above, TSCA also raises 
fundamental questions about the appropriate role for the judiciary in overseeing the role of 
agencies. Many of the assessments of TSCA, for example, have pointed to judicial review as a 
deterrent to EPA action to regulate chemical substances. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 15, at 
10038 (noting that ―[t]he argument can certainly be made that EPA‘s § 6 authority to impose 
controls on existing chemicals has been stymied by court interpretations of EPA‘s statutory 
burden, as was evidenced in the court decision on the Agency‘s asbestos ban,‖ but also noting 
that ―the courts have interpreted EPA‘s authority to impose testing requirements under . . . 
TSCA quite broadly‖). And it raises issues about the proper structure of federalism, notably 
how responsibility should be arranged between the federal and state governments. For one 
collection and review of some of the literature on federalism, particularly in the environmental 
arena, see David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 27. S. REP. No. 94-698, at 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4491. 
 28. U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, Toxic Substances (Apr. 1971), reprinted in 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 757 (1976) [hereinafter Toxic Substances]. See also Lynn 
L. Bergeson et al., TSCA and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 15 EPA ADMIN. L. REP. 1, 3 
(2000); John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical Principles for Chemical 
Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 723 (2008); ENV‘T AND NATURAL RES. POLICY 
DIV., 94TH CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT V, 
159 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Legislative History of TSCA] (noting that the 1971 CEQ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/11
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nation faced in addressing concerns about toxic substances, the CEQ 
recommended TSCA‘s enactment based on its view that: (1) ―toxic 
substances are entering the environment‖; (2) ―these substances can 
have severe effects‖; (3) ―existing legal authorities are inadequate‖; 
and (4) ―new legal authority is required.‖29 
The CEQ notes that Congress envisioned that ―[f]or the first time, 
the law [TSCA] empowers the federal government to control and 
even to stop production or use of chemical substances that may 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment.‖30 
How would this work in practice? In its Annual Report the year after 
Congress enacted TSCA, the CEQ summarizes: 
Manufacturers must give notice of plans to produce a new 
chemical or to market a significant new use for an old 
chemical. Producers may also be required to test selected 
chemicals or to report production quantities, uses, physical, 
chemical, and biological properties, and other information 
necessary for hazard assessment. In addition, the law requires 
recordkeeping and disclosure of significant health effects of 
dangerous chemicals. 
 The new public policy expressed in the law is that 
manufacturers of chemicals have an obligation to test product 
safety and that government has the authority to regulate 
potentially dangerous chemicals and to take immediate action 
on those that are an imminent hazard.
31
 
In the rest of this Part, I review two of the key underlying 
assumptions Congress brought to the consideration and enactment of 
TSCA, specifically the emerging concern about risks posed by toxic 
substances and the need for legal reinforcements to fill in extant gaps 
in legal authority so that, as a nation, we could address these risks 
effectively. 
 
report Toxic Substances was ―the impetus for the original Toxic Substances Control Act 
legislation‖). 
 29. Toxic Substances, supra note 28, at 759–60.  
 30. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE EIGHTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5 (1977) [hereinafter CEQ 
1977 Report]. 
 31. CEQ 1977 Report, supra note 30, at 5.  
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A. Emerging Concerns about Risks Posed by Toxic Substances 
During the 1970s, policy makers and others increasingly paid 
attention to the risks that toxic substances posed to human health and 
the environment. Some of the CEQ reports during this era 
demonstrate this. The CEQ 1971 report White Paper, referenced 
above, observed that significant numbers of new chemicals enter 
commercial use annually, that use of these chemicals is growing 
rapidly, and that, while ―many of these substances are not toxic, the 
sheer number of them, their increasing diversity and use, and the 
environmental problems already encountered from some indicate the 
existence of a problem.‖32 The CEQ, in the opening chapter of its 
1975 Annual Report, suggests that ―[a] disconcerting, growing body 
of evidence indicates that subtle, manmade hazards are supplanting 
famine and infectious disease as significant determinants of life 
expectancy in 20th century developed nations.‖33 The CEQ 1977 
Annual Report notes that the ―importance of dealing with toxic 
substances comprehensively and systematically has been highlighted 
in recent years by growing recognition of the environmental—and, in 
particular, chemical—contributions to cancer.‖34 The CEQ 1978 
Annual Report similarly identifies a ―[h]eightened awareness of toxic 
chemical problems‖35 and refers to the ―urgency of the toxics 
problem.‖36 
The legislative history of TSCA is to the same effect. It reflects 
that Congress enacted TSCA because of its growing concern about 
the risks that chemicals used in commerce posed to public health and 
the environment. For example, during a March 26, 1976, Senate 
debate about TSCA, Senator Pearson, one of the bill‘s sponsors,37 
stated that:  
 
 32. Toxic Substances, supra note 28, at 759.  
 33. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: SIXTH ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 12 (1975) [hereinafter CEQ 1975 
Report]. 
 34. CEQ 1977 Report, supra note 30, at 4. 
 35. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: NINTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 183 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 
CEQ Report]. 
 36. Id. at 184. 
 37. Legislative History of TSCA, supra note 28, at 218.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/11
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We can no longer operate under the assumption that what we 
do not know about a chemical substance cannot hurt us. Tragic 
results associated with too many toxic substances have taught 
us that lesson all too well. Chemicals, not people, must be put 
to the test.
38
  
During the same debate, Senator Tunney, who was also a leading 
participant in the debate preceding TSCA‘s enactment,39 noted that:  
[T]he National Cancer Institute has estimated that 60 to 90 
percent of the cancers occurring in this country are a result of 
environmental contaminants. Many doctors and scientists now 
believe that cancer, which has been projected to kill as many 
Americans in 1975 as all the battle deaths in Vietnam, Korea, 
and the Second World War combined, appears particularly 
susceptible to a preventive approach through control of toxic 
substances.
40
 
Congress was not, of course, operating in a vacuum as it 
expressed concern about the risk toxic chemicals posed. Popular 
media programs at the time highlighted concerns with toxic 
chemicals, and this media attention was not lost on members of 
Congress.
41
 For example, Senator Tunney referenced a ―60-minute 
CBS television special outlin[ing] the impact of environmental cancer 
on society‖ and ―a cover story in Newsweek demonstrating the 
 
 38. Id. at 215. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)-(b) (2006). 
 39. Another Senator recognized Senator Tunney‘s involvement: 
I also compliment the Senator from California (Mr. Tunney) who has been working on 
this legislation for all these many years, who conducted long hearings, frequently 
doing it in a solitary operation, in which he was able to provide for a continued interest 
in the committee, and making sure that we did something affirmatively to control the 
detrimental effect of toxic chemicals in American society. 
Legislative History of TSCA, supra note 28, at 217. 
 40. Id. at 208. 
 41. See, e.g., M.E. Kraft, Influence of American NGOs on Environmental Decisions and 
Policies: Evolution over Three Decades, in NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ROLE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS: RUSSIAN CHALLENGES AMERICAN LESSONS: PROCEEDINGS OF A 
WORKSHOP 141, 144 (2001) (noting that the ―rising level of public concern about 
environmental problems, particularly threats to public health from pollution and toxic 
chemicals‖ contributed to ―environmental and health groups in their quest for policy action‖). 
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impact of environmental cancers on our society.‖42 Much of the 
media attention focused on health threats from particular chemicals. 
Senator Tunney‘s comment during the TSCA debates, quoted below, 
signals Congress‘s awareness of the then-much-publicized dangers 
that several toxic chemicals pose:  
The need for this legislation has become increasingly clear. In 
the last 3 years, for example, I have chaired hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Commerce which have documented time 
and again the lethal dangers associated with chemicals like 
vinyl chloride, bischloromethyl ether—BCME—mercury and 
other heavy metals, arsenic, asbestos, and a multitude of 
others. In fact, over the 15 days of hearing conducted by the 
Committee on Commerce on this legislation over the past 5 
years, in excess of 100 chemicals have been mentioned as 
candidates for regulation under this legislation.
43
  
 In a practical guide to TSCA published in the mid-1990s, three 
private attorneys summarize nicely the human health concerns that 
led Congress to enact TSCA:  
When enacting TSCA, Congress reacted to concerns about the 
potential adverse health and environmental effects of certain 
chemical substances that were widely used in commerce. The 
then-recent kepone contamination of the James River, as well 
as discoveries about dangers posed by polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) and methyl chloride, prompted 
congressional concern that many existing chemicals posed 
significant health and environmental risks, and that no legal 
mechanism existed to impede the introduction of the next 
generation of equally dangerous chemicals.
44
 
Ed Brooks, of EPA‘s Chemical Control Division, suggests that 
three concerns ―animated the drive for an authority to control existing 
 
 42. Legislative History of TSCA, supra note 28, at 210. 
 43. Id. at 207–08. 
 44. Carolyne R. Hathaway, David J. Hayes & William K. Rawson, A Practitioner’s Guide 
to the Toxic Substances Control Act: Part I, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10207, 10208 (1994) (citing S. 
REP. No. 94-698, at 5–6 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4495). 
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chemicals:‖ (1) ―[t]he cancer mortality rate had been accelerating 
since before World War II;‖ (2) ―[i]ndustrial chemicals were believed 
to be a major cause of the increase;‖ and (3) ―[a]uthorities to control 
many problems posed by industrial chemicals were either non-
existent or inadequate.‖45 
The basic point is that in the 1970s Congress became increasingly 
concerned about risks posed by toxic substances and took a series of 
legislative actions in an effort to respond to these risks. Congress did 
not believe that the challenges posed by toxic substances would be 
addressed easily or that TSCA alone would provide adequate tools 
for an effective response. Congress also acknowledged that the task 
was beyond EPA‘s capacity acting independently. For example, the 
1977 CEQ Annual Report notes that the task of reducing risks from 
toxic substances ―will not be accomplished easily. It will require 
coordination of research and regulation by many agencies under a 
dozen or more major federal laws, a program to fill information gaps 
and provide easy access to the data that exist, adequate funding, and 
intensive effort by trained people.‖46  
The 1978 CEQ Report notes that ―many other laws . . . 
complement TSCA authority. In all, at least 20 regulatory statutes 
apply to toxic substances control.‖47 The CEQ notes that, for 
instance, ―[t]he Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 require EPA to 
consider regulations for several specific pollutants suspected or 
known to be toxic.‖48 And, ―[l]ikewise, the 1977 amendments to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act require best available 
technology by 1984 for . . . classes of toxic chemicals and provide for 
cleanup action [concerning] other potentially toxic chemicals by 
 
 45. Ed Brooks, Evolution of Risk Management of Existing Chemicals under TSCA, in 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF POLLUTION CONTROL AND 
TOXICS, TSCA AT TWENTY (1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/cie/archive/issue 
04j.htm.  
 46. CEQ 1977 Report, supra note 30, at 3. 
 47. 1978 CEQ Report, supra note 35, at 180–82. The 1979 CEQ Report provides that, as 
of that time, there were more than two dozen federal laws controlling toxic substances in 
―various forms and places: from pesticides to foods, from the workplace to the nation‘s air and 
water.‖ COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 174 (1979). 
 48. 1978 CEQ Report, supra note 35, at 183. 
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1987.‖49 And, third, ―[s]trong emphasis on toxics and human health 
concerns was written into [RCRA]‖ in 1976.50 Congress‘s relatively 
contemporaneous strengthening amendments to other statutes‘ 
treatment of toxics shows that Congress intended for the scheme it 
established under TSCA to be implemented in tandem with greater 
attention to toxics and their release under these other statutory 
schemes as well.
51
 TSCA, in other words, was intended to be part of 
this more comprehensive fix. In the next section, I turn to the nature 
of the regulatory gaps Congress perceived in the effort to address 
risks from toxic substances and Congress‘s actions to fill them. 
B. Regulatory Gaps 
Congress‘s view in adopting TSCA was that existing legislation 
had significant shortcomings that TSCA would help to cure. I focus 
on three of the shortcomings in this section.
52
 First, existing 
legislation tended to have an ―after-the-fact‖ focus. The CEQ‘s 1971 
report, Toxic Substances, highlights this concern, noting that existing 
legislation ―generally deal[s] with a problem only after it is 
manifest,‖ and asserts that ―[w]e should no longer be limited to 
repairing the damage after it has been done.‖53 Then-EPA Deputy 
Administrator John Quarles made the same point in 1975 testimony 
before Congress on the importance of enacting TSCA: ―While some 
authority exists to control the production of certain categories of toxic 
substances, such as pesticides, drugs, and food additives, most 
existing Federal authorities are designed to prevent harmful exposure 
only after the substances have been introduced into production.‖54 
After describing health concerns posed by chemicals, the Senate 
Committee on Commerce provided in its Report Number 94-698: 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Related to the three reasons discussed in the text, Congress also thought there might 
be a need for additional regulatory authority beyond that contained in the extant statutes to 
address the risks from toxic substances. 
 53. Toxic Substances, supra note 28, at 783, 760.  
 54. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Quarles Testifies on the Need for Toxic Substances Act 
(July 10, 1975), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/01.htm. 
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In order to protect against these dangers, the proposed Toxic 
Substances Control Act would close a number of major 
regulatory gaps, for while certain statutes, including the Clean 
Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, may be used to protect health and the 
environment from chemical substances, none of these statutes 
provide the means for discovering adverse effects on health 
and environment before manufacture of new chemical 
substances. Under these other statutes, the Government 
regulator‘s only response to chemical dangers is to impose 
restrictions after manufacture begins.
55
 
Similarly, in a 1976 Senate debate, a Senator recognized that ―[a]t 
present, the only remedy available under such Federal statutes as the 
Clean Air Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Consumer Product 
Safety Act, is to impose restrictions on toxic substances after they 
have been first manufactured.‖56  
An important congressional objective in TSCA was to 
complement the after-the-fact character of the primary regulatory 
statutes by focusing attention on toxics earlier in their development 
and use. In enacting TSCA Congress created a regulatory focus that 
did not yet exist—regulation of chemicals before they were 
manufactured.
57
 As the 1978 CEQ Report notes: ―The intent of 
[TSCA] is that the harmful effects of chemicals produced in the 
future shall be investigated and if possible discovered in the 
laboratory rather than turning up in injuries to human beings or the 
environment after full-scale production has begun.‖58 Some 
commentators have referred to this goal as one of ―creating 
‗upstream‘ protections against the introduction of new chemical 
 
 55. Legislative History of TSCA, supra note 28, at 161 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 215 (emphasis added). One of the key features of early federal pollution control 
legislation was Congress‘s reluctance to ―go up the pipe‖ and regulate industrial processes. 
Instead, Congress focused on discharges at the end of the pipe. Robert Glicksman & 
Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 LAW & 
COMTEMP. PROBS. 249, 252 (1991). 
 57. 1978 CEQ Report, supra note 35, at 196. 
 58. Id. 
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substances that could create serious health and environmental 
risks.‖59 
Second, existing legislation tended to be media-focused. It did not 
take a holistic or comprehensive approach to pollution control. On 
this point CEQ declares that ―[i]t is clear that current laws are 
inadequate to control the actual and potential dangers of toxic 
substances comprehensively or systematically.‖60 It suggests that the 
media-based pollution laws, primarily air and water, did not 
adequately account for ―individuals‘ total exposure to chemicals or 
for chemical pollution that shifts among media . . . . By regulating 
chemicals per se, TSCA was supposed to avoid these gaps or to fill 
them when they appear, as well as to regulate more efficiently and 
effectively.‖61 As the CEQ put it in Toxic Substances, these ―media-
oriented authorities‖ had difficulties considering the ―total exposure 
of an individual to a given substance‖ because of the possibility of 
human exposure in a variety of ways:
62
  
Most toxic substances are not exclusively air or water 
pollutants but can be found in varying quantities in air, water, 
soil, food, and industrial and consumer products. The 
multiplicity of ways by which man can be exposed to these 
substances makes it difficult for the media-oriented authorities 
to consider the total exposure of an individual to a given 
substance, a consideration necessary for the establishment of 
adequate environmental standards.
63
 
Similarly, the July 14, 1976, House of Representatives Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce Report Number 94-1341 
concludes that, based on Toxic Substances, ―present authorities for 
protecting against hazardous chemicals are fragmented and 
inadequate.‖64  
The felt need for additional information on toxic chemicals, while 
related to each of these two motivations for TSCA, was on its own a 
 
 59. Hathaway et al., supra note 44, Part I at 10208. 
 60. Toxic Substances, supra note 28, at 783.  
 61. Applegate, supra note 21, at 724, 726. 
 62. Toxic Substances, supra note 28, at 760. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Legislative History of TSCA, supra note 28, at 412. 
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strong impetus for Congress‘s decision to enact TSCA and deserves 
emphasis as well. As some of the statements quoted above reflect, 
Congress believed there was a significant need for additional 
information about toxic substances—about their toxicity, the 
possibility of exposure, and the risk they posed. The July 14, 1976, 
House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Report Number 94-1341, relying on Toxic Substances, 
noted that additional ―authority is needed to require testing of 
chemicals to determine their health and environmental effects . . . and 
to collect information on chemicals where necessary to protect the 
public health and using such information.‖65 In its 1975 Annual 
Report, the CEQ noted that ―[w]e know very little about the possible 
health consequences of these new [chemical] compounds.‖66 EPA‘s 
then-Administrator, Russell Train, highlighted the information gaps 
as follows: 
[W]e know so little—so abysmally little—about these 
chemicals. We know little about their health effects . . . . We 
know little about how many humans are exposed, and how and 
to what degree. We do not even know precisely how many—
much less precisely which—new chemical compounds are 
made and marketed every year.
67
  
 In its 1978 Annual Report, CEQ summarized TSCA‘s role in 
helping to develop new information about the risks toxic chemicals 
posed: ―The [TSCA] gave the government a new mandate and broad 
new authority to gather information on the potential of chemicals to 
damage human health and the environment . . . . The result is more 
awareness on the part of government, industry, scientists, and the 
public of the problems of toxic chemicals.‖68 
 
 65. Id. The Committee also noted the importance of regulatory authority to ―impose use 
and distribution restrictions on chemicals where necessary to protect the public health and 
environment.‖ Id. 
 66. CEQ 1975 Report, supra note 33, at 12. 
 67. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Train Sees New Toxic Substances Law as ―Preventive 
Medicine‖ (Oct. 21, 1976), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/03.htm. 
 68. 1978 CEQ Report, supra note 35, at 178. 
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 In the year after TSCA was enacted, the CEQ, in its 1977 Annual 
Report, succinctly summarized some of Congress‘s concerns and 
TSCA‘s anticipated role in addressing them: 
Until the [TSCA] was passed, there was simply no way to 
assess or control the development, production, and marketing 
of the flood of manmade chemicals. Many of these complex 
chemicals do a great deal of good and little harm, but some are 
among the most toxic and persistent substances ever 
introduced into our environment. 
 Unhappily, the toxicity and persistence of chemicals have 
often been discovered after their widespread use and after they 
have become important to jobs, commerce, or agriculture. . . .  
 [T]he major accomplishment of the new law is that it gives 
the government broad authority to control the production, 
distribution, and use of all potentially hazardous chemicals. It 
provides for testing of suspect chemicals before they become 
widely used and economically important. It emphasizes 
collection of information and freedom of access to research 
data so that the scientific community can note and assess 
potential problems.
69
 
To be sure, other concerns were on Congress‘s radar screen as 
well, such as the need for additional regulatory authority to control 
manufacture and use of toxics where needed and the need to proceed 
in a ―reasonable and prudent manner,‖ and in a way that did not 
impede technological innovation.
70
 Related to this last point, EPA 
 
 69. CEQ 1977 Report, supra note 30, at 1–3. The CEQ report pointed to the risks 
associated with PCBs as one example. Id. at 2. See also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 2–3 (1972) (―One of the obstacles to adequate data collection on 
toxic substances is the absence of any Federal program for systematically regulating and 
collecting data. This gap would be filled by passage of [TSCA].‖). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), (3), and (c) (2006). The Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce noted in Report Number 94-1341 that ―[t]he Committee has limited the 
Administrator to taking action only against unreasonable risks because to do otherwise assumes 
that a risk-free society is attainable, an assumption that the Committee does not make.‖ 
Legislative History of TSCA, supra note 28, at 423. Thus, ―unreasonable risk‖ is used as the 
standard. Id. at 748.  
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argued that TSCA‘s costs to industry would not be significant; 
indeed, John Quarles testified that TSCA‘s premanufacture 
notification scheme should be ―economically preferable to industry‖ 
because its role in identifying dangers early on would help to ―avoid 
the serious disruption and losses attendant to remedial action after the 
fact‖ and that costs to industry would be ―relatively modest‖ 
compared to the benefits.
71
  
Further, to venture briefly into a slightly more in-depth review of 
Congress‘s understandings and objectives in enacting TSCA, 
Congress brought the then-extant understanding of toxicology to its 
consideration of TSCA. As the CRS points out, while toxicology ―is 
an ancient area of study,‖ its ―modern form‖ ―emerged . . . largely 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The first textbook of toxicology was 
published in 1972.‖72 Reflecting then-contemporary perspectives, 
TSCA focused on individual chemicals and concerns about acute 
effects, birth defects, and cancer.
73
 As the CRS notes, understandings 
of toxicology (and techniques for evaluating hazard and exposure) 
have evolved considerably during the past thirty years.
74
  
In sum, while Congress‘s enactment of TSCA was informed by a 
variety of goals and then-extant understandings of hazard and risk 
assessment, from a big picture perspective, three of Congress‘s key 
assumptions in adopting TSCA were that we needed to: (1) embrace 
a more proactive or preventative approach to understanding toxics 
and limiting their risks; (2) approach risks from toxics in a holistic 
rather than fragmented way; and (3) develop a great deal of 
information in order to increase understanding about the toxicity of 
toxics and the risks they posed.  
A final observation in this brief introduction to the thinking at the 
time Congress enacted TSCA is that proponents did not believe 
hoped-for benefits from enactment would be easy to achieve, as the 
CEQ candidly acknowledged: 
 
 71. Press Release, U.S. EPA, Quarles Testifies on the Need for Toxic Substances Act 
(July 10, 1975), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/01.htm. 
 72. CRS, supra note 17, at 24. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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 But bringing toxic substances under control is more easily 
said than done. The number of chemical substances and the 
size of the chemical industry suggest the magnitude of the task. 
In November 1977, the registry of chemicals maintained by the 
American Chemical Society listed 4,039,907 distinct chemical 
compounds—and the registry includes only chemicals reported 
in the literature since 1965. The list has been growing at a rate 
of 6,000 per week. The number of chemicals currently in 
commercial production in the United States may be as high as 
70,000; 50 are produced in quantities greater than 1.3 billion 
pounds per year. One hundred and fifteen thousand 
establishments are involved in the production and distribution 
of chemicals, and the business is worth $113 billion per year, 
about 7 percent of the nation‘s GNP. 
 These numbers suggest two points. One is the astonishing 
dependence of modern life on chemicals that are synthesized 
or isolated from natural products. A second is the staggering 
task that faces industry and government in regulating the 
production and distribution of so many different entities.
75
  
With this overview of some of Congress‘s key assumptions and 
objectives in enacting TSCA, I turn to a brief summary of some of 
the statute‘s important provisions. 
 
 75. 1978 CEQ Report, supra note 35, at 178. 
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF KEY FEATURES OF TSCA AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION
76
  
In Part II, I summarize four key features of TSCA and 
developments concerning each over the past thirty-plus years. As 
with the preceding Part, my purpose is to highlight a handful of key 
features rather than provide a comprehensive review.
77
 I begin by 
reviewing TSCA‘s jurisdictional boundaries or scope. I then turn to 
some of the screening-related tools TSCA provides. Third, I discuss 
treatment of ―new‖ chemical substances. Finally, I summarize some 
of the regulatory powers Congress assigned to EPA in TSCA. 
A. TSCA’s Jurisdictional Scope  
TSCA has a potentially enormously (―overwhelmingly‖) broad 
jurisdictional reach.
78
 This is because it covers a wide variety of 
activities involving ―chemical substance[s],‖ including the 
manufactur[ing], process[ing], distribut[ing] in commerce, us[ing], or 
dispos[ing] of‖ such substances.79 Congress further defines ―chemical 
substances‖80 expansively as ―[a]ny organic or inorganic substance of 
a particular molecular identity, including—(i) any combination of 
such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical 
reaction or occurring in nature and (ii) any element or uncombined 
 
 76. Many sources provide very helpful overviews of how TSCA works. See, e.g., CRS 
Report, supra note 17; LYNN L. BERGESON, TSCA: TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2000); 
a three-part practitioner‘s guide to TSCA, Hathaway et al., supra note 44, Parts I–III at 10207, 
10285, 10357; and a number of the Government Accountability Office reports, such as JOHN B. 
STEPHENSON, U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-217R, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005) [hereinafter 
GAO November 2005]. The reader should refer to these and other more detailed discussions of 
TSCA for more in-depth and more complete coverage. The purpose of this section is simply to 
provide an overview of some of the more significant features of TSCA rather than a 
comprehensive picture of how the statute is structured and operates.  
 77. For example, I do not spend much time on the issue of transparency, a topic that has 
received considerable attention. See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law 
and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817 (2009); Applegate, supra note 
21. 
 78. Hathaway et al., supra note 44, Part I at 10209 (noting that ―[t]he scope of TSCA is 
extraordinarily broad‖). 
 79. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 6–7 (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 710.3 (2009).  
 80. 15 USC § 2601(b) (2006). 
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radical.‖81 As EPA puts it, ―TSCA defines ‗chemical substance‘ 
broadly and in terms which cover microorganisms as well as 
traditional chemicals.‖82 
There were approximately 62,000 chemicals in commerce and 
covered by TSCA as of the late 1970s, when EPA began reviewing 
chemicals under TSCA.
83
 Congress anticipated that TSCA would 
apply to ―existing‖ chemical substances and to ―new‖ chemical 
substances and that EPA would maintain an inventory that would 
include both.
84
 EPA has added more than 21,000 new chemicals to 
the inventory since the 1970s,
85
 and it currently includes over 84,000 
chemicals.
86
 One of the (many) outstanding issues that has not been 
fully resolved during implementation of TSCA over the past thirty-
plus years involves how EPA should prioritize among chemical 
substances in conducting its reviews.
87
 Developing a workable 
prioritization scheme and assuring adequate resources to administer it 
are two of the issues TSCA‘s extraordinarily broad jurisdictional 
parameters raise in the context of possible reform.
88
  
 
 81. Id. § 2602(2)(A); see also 40 C.F.R. § 720.3(e). TSCA specifically exempts some 
materials from the definition of chemical substances, such as pesticides, tobacco, foods, drugs, 
and cosmetics. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B) (2006).  
 82. Final Regulations under Toxic Substances Control Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 17,909, 17,911 
(Apr. 11, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 700, 720, 721, 723, 725); CRS Report, supra note 
17, at 2 (describing the scope of TSCA as ―very broad.‖). 
 83. U.S. EPA, What is the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory?, http://www.epa.gov/ 
opptintr/newchems/pubs/invntory.htm (last visited May 18, 2010). While EPA reports the 
62,000 figure, some sources offer slightly different estimates. See, e.g., CRS Report, supra note 
17, at 3. As the CRS points out, the ―potential chemical universe . . . has been described as 
‗unimaginably immense‘.‖ CRS Report, supra note 17, at 3 n.4. 
 84. Toxic Substances Control Act § 8(b); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b)(1) (2006). 
 85. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-428T, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 3 
(2009) [hereinafter GAO February 2009]. 
 86. U.S. EPA, Chemical Assessment and Management Program (ChAMP), http://www. 
epa.gov/champ/pubs/basic.html (last visited May 18, 2010). EPA is currently developing a 
―TSCA Inventory Reset‖ in an effort to update the Inventory to ―more accurately reflect 
chemicals‖ that are now in commerce. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Mark Greenwood, supra note 15, at 10036–37. 
 88. Id. at 10036; Applegate, supra note 21, at 763. Greenwood in particular highlights 
TSCA‘s resource shortfalls and the need to match resources to functions in his January 2009 
article. Greenwood, supra note 15, at 10036. Another issue involves whether to extend TSCA 
jurisdiction to newer and emerging materials, such as GMOs and nanomaterials. See, e.g., CRS 
Report, supra note 17. 
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B. Testing
89
 
One of Congress‘s major objectives in TSCA was to increase the 
amount of information available about chemicals and the risks they 
may pose.
90
 As a result, Congress included several provisions that 
provide for testing of chemical substances in different 
circumstances.
91
 One provision that has received considerable 
attention, TSCA § 4(a), compels EPA to require testing of chemical 
substances in certain situations in order to assess their potentially 
harmful effects on health and the environment.
92
 First, EPA must 
require such testing if it finds that: ―the manufacture, distribution in 
commerce, processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance . . . 
may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment‖;93 there currently are ―insufficient data or experience‖ 
to be able to reasonably determine or predict the effect of such 
substance on health or the environment; and testing is ―necessary to 
develop such data.‖94 Alternatively, EPA must require testing if it 
finds that: ―a chemical substance . . . will be produced in substantial 
quantities, and it . . . may . . . enter the environment in substantial 
quantities or there . . . may be significant human exposure to such 
substance‖; there are ―insufficient data or experience‖ to be able to 
reasonably determine or predict the effect of such substance on health 
or the environment; and testing is necessary to develop such data.
95
  
If EPA makes either of the sets of findings just described, EPA 
―shall by rule‖ require testing on the substance that is relevant to 
 
 89. The GAO has suggested that six major sections of TSCA (§§ 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14) 
establish the parameters for the statute‘s role in addressing risks from chemicals in commerce. 
GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 7.  
 90. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2006).  
 91. David Roe discusses the ―apparently omnibus testing authority‖ in TSCA. David Roe, 
Ready or Not: The Coming Wave of Toxic Chemicals, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 627 (2002). The 
testing framework in TSCA contains several steps and is quite complex. My objective in the 
text is to summarize some of the basic issues under § 4. See Hathaway et al., supra note 44, and 
BERGESON, supra note 76, among others, for more in-depth treatment. For discussion of section 
8 requirements, including the Preliminary Assessment Information Reporting (―PAIR‖) 
requirements, see CRS Report, supra note 17, at 12. 
 92. Toxic Substances Control Act § 4(a); 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2006).  
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
 94. Id. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii). 
 95. Id. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i),(A)(ii)–(iii). 
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whether the substance ―does or does not present an unreasonable risk 
of injury to health or the environment.‖96 Alternatively, EPA has 
developed a process in which it may enter into an Enforceable 
Consent Agreement (―ECA‖) to have a party conduct the necessary 
testing.
97
 In most instances, EPA directs ―manufacturers‖ to conduct 
the necessary testing.
98
  
Once EPA decides testing is appropriate, the Agency has ―broad 
discretion‖ to require testing that the Agency believes is needed to 
evaluate the possible risks the chemical substances pose to human 
health or the environment.
99
 EPA guidelines include testing for 
―chemical fate,‖ environmental effects, and health effects.100 EPA is 
to consider both the toxicity of a chemical substance and the potential 
for exposure in making risk judgments.
101
  
The GAO‘s current take on this regime, as expressed in June 2005 
testimony to Congress, is that ―[f]acing difficulties obtaining such 
information [concerning the risk existing chemicals pose]. . . , EPA 
has made little progress in reviewing existing chemicals since EPA 
began reviewing chemicals under TSCA in 1979.‖102 The GAO 
indicated that EPA officials stated that, because of the burdens 
involved, finalizing a test rule could take two to ten years and would 
require considerable financial resources.
103
 The GAO concluded that 
 
 96. Id. § 2603(a).  
 97. U.S. EPA, Managing Existing Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ar/2007-2009/ 
managing/index.htm (last visited May 18, 2010); see also BERGESON, supra note 76, at 12. 
National Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 595 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), held that such 
voluntary programs did not provide for public comment and did not always have enforcement 
mechanisms. EPA responded with a rulemaking intended to address the court‘s concerns. For a 
review of this case and subsequent EPA efforts, see GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 19–24. 
EPA continues to use Enforceable Consent Agreements today. U.S. EPA, Managing Existing 
Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ar/2007-2009/managing/index.htm (last visited May 18, 
2010).  
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(3)(A) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 790.42; BERGESON, supra note 76, at 
11. Because of the enormous number of chemical substances, EPA relies upon the Interagency 
Testing Committee (―ITC‖) and other sources of expertise for recommendations concerning 
substances that warrant testing. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e)(1)(A) (2006); BERGESON, supra note 
76, at 11–12; GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 21, 26.  
 99. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 14. 
 100. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 796–798 (2009); BERGESON, supra note 76, at 14–15. 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e) (2006). 
 102. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 19.  
 103. Id. at 26. 
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―TSCA‘s authority to require testing is difficult to use in support of 
the agency‘s review process‖ and, as a result, ―[a]ccording to EPA 
officials, EPA‘s toxicity and exposure data on existing chemicals is 
often incomplete.‖104 The GAO stated that: ―[g]iven the difficulties 
involved in requiring testing, EPA officials do not believe that 
TSCA‘s authorities under section 4 provide an effective means for 
testing a large number of chemicals.‖105  
While the CRS‘s 2008 Report for Congress indicates that, in an 
apparent change of position, the then-head of EPA‘s toxic substances 
office, Assistant Administrator James Gulliford, testified to Congress 
in 2006 that EPA authorities were adequate for it to ensure ―effective, 
timely, chemical management decisions,‖106 in its 2009 testimony to 
Congress, the GAO echoes and reinforces its previous findings that 
EPA‘s testing authority is flawed. It reports that EPA does not 
routinely assess the risks of the roughly 80,000 industrial chemicals 
in use.
107
 The GAO reports that EPA has issued rules or entered into 
agreements requiring testing ―for only about 200 chemicals‖ because 
of the time and resources involved.
108
 For the same reasons, EPA has 
performed ―internal reviews‖ of ―an estimated 2 percent of the 
chemicals that were in the TSCA inventory when EPA began 
chemical reviews in 1979.‖109 The GAO concludes that the TSCA 
regime ―places the burden on EPA to demonstrate a need for data on 
a chemical‘s toxicity rather than on a company to demonstrate that a 
chemical is safe.‖110 The GAO indicates that EPA advises that the 
Agency could review ―substantially more chemicals in less time if [it] 
had the authority to require chemical companies to conduct testing 
and provide test data on chemicals once they reach a substantial 
 
 104. Id. at 19. 
 105. Id. at 26. 
 106. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 14–15. 
 107. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 5–6; GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 4, 26. 
For a helpful summary of EPA‘s treatment of testing under the panoply of testing authorities, 
see CRS Report, supra note 17, at 11–14. 
 108. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 5; see also GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 4, 
18. The CRS reports that EPA has issued test rules under Section 4 for approximately 254 
existing chemicals: ―60 chemicals using [ECA‘s], 24 chemicals under negotiated testing 
agreements, and about 170 chemicals covered by final test rules.‖ CRS Report, supra note 17, 
at 13. 
 109. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 18.  
 110. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 5. 
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production volume, assuming EPA had first determined that these 
data cannot be obtained without testing.‖111 The GAO notes that it 
has ―long held a similar view,‖ and observes that it ―continue[s] to 
believe that providing EPA with more authority to obtain test data 
from companies would enhance the effectiveness of TSCA.‖112 
Others have echoed the GAO‘s concerns.113 
Implementation of the statutory testing regimen is not the entire 
story with respect to TSCA testing, however. Non-governmental 
organization (―NGO‖) studies in the late 1990s, twenty years after 
TSCA was enacted, found that toxicity data were not publicly 
available for most of the roughly 2,800 high productive volume 
(―HPV‖) chemicals manufactured or imported in the United States.114 
A former Senior Environmental Defense lawyer, David Roe, 
characterized the findings of this work in powerful terms:  
In 1997–98, however, the assumption that we have any real 
grasp of which chemicals are toxic was definitively shattered. 
. . . The studies‘ [conducted by Environmental Defense, EPA, 
and the Chemical Manufacturers Association] implications 
were acutely unsettling: in a regulatory system that depends on 
identifying target chemicals before regulating them, less than 
10% of the largest potential targets had been properly scanned 
for toxic effects.
115
 
Following these studies, in 1998 EPA collaborated with chemical 
companies and environmental groups and established the HPV 
Challenge Program, in which the agency seeks to have manufacturers 
voluntarily develop basic toxicity data for these chemicals pursuant 
 
 111. Id. at 6; GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
 112. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 6.  
 113. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 21, at 734–36; RICHARD A. DENISON, 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS: A FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HIGH 
PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL CHALLENGE (July 2007), http://www.edf.org/documents/ 
6653_HighHopesLowMarks.pdf. 
 114. HPV‘s were defined to be those produced at one million pounds or more per year. 
GAO November 2005, supra note 76, at 11; GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 4; BERGESON, 
supra note 76, at 16. An environmental group, Environmental Defense (then EDF) undertook 
one study, while an industry trade group, the American Chemistry Council (then the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association) undertook another. Roe, supra note 91, at 627–28. 
 115. Roe, supra note 91, at 627–28. 
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to a Screening Information Data Set (―SIDS‖) program that the 
OECD had developed.
116
  
The GAO reports that ―[s]ince 1998, EPA has focused its efforts 
on obtaining information on existing chemicals through voluntary 
programs, such as the HPV Challenge Program.‖117 Environmental 
Defense, one of the key environmental NGOs involved in the 
initiative, notes that the HPV Challenge Program ―represents the only 
systematic effort by the [EPA] to foster the development of and 
public access to basic hazard data on a relatively large number of 
chemicals in commerce.‖118 Environmental Defense elaborates as 
follows: ―The program is developing and making public basic hazard 
information for more chemicals in much less time than any prior 
effort, and it represents the first significant step taken in the US 
toward closing the gap between what we know and what we should 
know about widely used chemicals.‖119 
The GAO paints a somewhat mixed picture of the HPV program. 
On the one hand, it indicates that some of the early results are 
promising. Companies have ―sponsored, or agreed to provide data 
for,‖ a significant majority of HPV chemicals. On the other hand, in 
2009 testimony, the GAO indicated that ―there are currently over 200 
high-production-volume chemicals for which chemical companies 
have not voluntarily agreed to provide the minimal test data that EPA 
believes are needed to initially assess their risks.‖120 Further, the 
GAO asks whether the data that are provided will prove sufficient for 
EPA to determine whether chemicals being reviewed present an 
unreasonable risk.
121
  
 
 116. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 15–16; Roe, supra note 91, at 629 (describing the HPV 
Challenge Program as a ―unique quasi-voluntary initiative‖). The OECD is the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. GAO November 2005, supra note 76, at 10; GAO 
June 2005, supra note 1, at 13. The court in Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Leavitt, 
331 F. Supp. 2d 204 (S.D.N.Y.2004), considered the legality of the HPV program and upheld it. 
The Second Circuit affirmed this holding in Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. 
Johnson, 436 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 117. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 18. 
 118. RICHARD B. DENISON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS: A 
FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL CHALLENGE 3 (July 
2007), http://www.edf.org/documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks.pdf. 
 119. Id. 
 120. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 5. 
 121. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 41. 
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While some industry and environmental groups collaborated with 
EPA and each other to develop the Challenge, their perspectives on it 
differ significantly. For example, Environmental Defense, in its 2007 
report on the HPV program entitled High Hopes, Low Marks,
122
 
concludes that the Challenge is ―limping as it approaches the finish 
line, with considerable amounts of the data [it promised to deliver] 
yet to be made available.‖123 The American Chemistry Council 
disagreed with the Environmental Defense assessment, highlighting 
the work companies had done in participating in the Challenge and 
concluding that ―[t]he HPV program has made more health and 
environmental data publicly available faster than any other regulatory 
or voluntary initiative before it.‖124  
EPA initiatives in this arena continue to evolve. EPA reports, for 
example, that it ―broadened its efforts to ensure the safety of existing 
chemicals with the creation of the Chemical Assessment and 
Management Program (ChAMP).‖125 EPA used ChAMP to ―build 
on‖ the HPV Challenge Program to complete screening and other 
actions on ―high- and moderate-production (MPV) chemicals 
[produced at quantities greater than or equal to 25,000 pounds per 
year].‖126 Mark Greenwood describes ChAMP as ―an ambitious effort 
. . . to assess and address the hazards and risk of over 6,000 chemicals 
 
 122. RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS: A 
FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICAL CHALLENGE (July 2007), 
http://www.edf.org/documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks.pdf. 
 123. Id. at 31. Environmental Defense graded the Challenge based on a series of metrics. 
Environmental Defense gave the Challenge good marks on some metrics and not-so-good 
grades on others. Id. at 11–21. 
 124. AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME (HPV) CHALLENGE 
PROGRAM: A LANDMARK PROGRAM MAKING MORE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DATA 
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE THAN EVER BEFORE (2007), http://www.americanchemistry.com/s_acc/ 
bin.asp?CID=181&DID=6668&DOC=FILE.PDF. For EPA‘s 2004 assessment of the HPV 
Challenge (the most recent listed on EPA‘s website as part of the HPV coverage when this 
Article was being prepared), see U.S. EPA, ―STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE HIGH 
PRODUCTION VOLUME (HPV) CHALLENGE PROGRAM‖ REPORT AND TRI-FOLD BROCHURE, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/hpv/pubs/general/hpvstatr.htm.  
 125. U.S. EPA, Managing Existing Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ar/2007-2009/ 
managing/index.htm (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 126. Id.  
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by the end of 2012.‖127 EPA‘s website provides a resource for the 
interested reader to monitor developments.
128
 
The GAO offers the following conclusion:  
While TSCA allows EPA to require the testing of existing 
chemicals through the rulemaking process, EPA has found it 
difficult and costly to make the findings necessary to 
promulgate rules, including findings that a chemical may pose 
unreasonable risks or that the chemical will be produced in 
substantial quantities, and that there is or may be substantial 
human or environmental exposure to the chemical. 
Consequently, to obtain the test information needed on existing 
chemicals, EPA relies extensively on the chemical industry to 
perform tests of . . . chemicals under (1) consent agreements 
. . . and (2) voluntary industry efforts under the HPV Challenge 
Program.
129
  
 The Congressional Research Service (―CRS‖) offers the following 
conclusion regarding the state of testing, including under the HPV 
and other voluntary programs: 
 
 127. Greenwood, supra note 15, at 10035. 
 128. See, e.g., United States EPA, Basic Information, Chemical Assessment and 
Management Program (CHAMP), http://www.epa.gov/champ/pubs/basic.html (last visited May 
18, 2010); U.S. EPA, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge, http://www.epa.gov/hpv/ 
(last visited May 18, 2010). For example, in December 2008, EPA proposed an ―Inorganic HPV 
Challenge Program‖ similar to the organic Challenge Program. U.S. EPA, Basic Information 
Chemical Assessment & Management Program, http://www.epa.gov/champ/pubs/basic.html 
(last visited May 18, 2010). EPA has also built on the HPV Challenge Program to develop a 
―Voluntary Children‘s Chemical Evaluation Program‖ (―VCCEP‖). U.S. EPA, Potential 
Chemical Risks to Children, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ar/2007-2009/managing/risks_to_ 
children.htm (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 129. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 34–35. EPA has initiated other voluntary programs 
as well. For example, in 2000 it began the Voluntary Children's Chemical Evaluation Program 
(―VCCEP‖) in an effort to ―help[ ]the public better understand the potential health risks to 
children associated with certain chemical exposures.‖ U.S. EPA, Potential Chemical Risks to 
Children, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ar/2007-2009/managing/risks_to_children.htm (last visited 
May 18, 2010). See also Implementation of the Pilot Voluntary Children‘s Chemical Education 
Program, 71 Fed. Reg. 67,121 (Nov. 20, 2006); GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 41–42. In its 
Spring Regulatory Agenda, the EPA indicated that the program was not currently involved in 
rulemaking and that the pilot program was nearing completion. U.S. EPA, Semiannual 
Regulatory Agenda—Spring 281–82 (2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/ 
Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064809844c2. 
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Despite the noteworthy progress being made through these 
voluntary programs [HPV and others], which is greater than 
under any previous TSCA initiative, most existing chemicals 
still lack toxicity data relevant to hazard assessment. Data also 
are lacking on production volume and use, which are critical 
for determining the potential for human and environmental 
exposure and for risk assessments that would permit priority 
setting for EPA action.
130
 
In sum, a primary purpose of TSCA is to address concerns about 
potentially toxic chemical substances by identifying the subset of the 
enormous number of chemical substances that pose potential risks 
and then requiring that manufacturers and others develop relevant 
data so that risk can be better understood. As this section reflects, one 
important question the experience with the TSCA § 4 regime raises, 
which Professor Adelman addresses,
131
 is whether TSCA‘s statutory 
scheme, as augmented by various ―voluntary‖ initiatives, strikes the 
right balance. If not, what can and should be done to reform the 
structure TSCA creates? These questions are also of central 
importance for the ―new‖ chemicals regime TSCA creates, to which I 
now turn. 
C. Treatment of “New” Chemicals and Chemicals Intended for 
Significant New Uses under TSCA § 5: Pre-Manufacture Notification 
―New‖ chemicals, and how best to be preventive in approach 
while not unduly impeding technological progress and economic 
opportunity, were issues of major concern to Congress in its 
enactment of TSCA, as discussed in Part I. TSCA creates a ―pre-
manufacture notification‖ (―PMN‖) scheme for ―new‖ chemicals and 
for other chemicals under certain circumstances.
132
 It provides that 
any person who wants to ―manufacture a new chemical substance‖133 
 
 130. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 17. 
 131. David E. Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics 
Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 377 (2010). 
 132. The GAO reports that, as of 2005, approximately ―700 new chemicals are introduced 
into commerce each year.‖ GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 1. TSCA also exempts certain 
chemical substances from PMN requirements. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 20. 
 133. Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(a)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
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or ―manufacture or process any chemical substance for a use which 
. . . is a significant new use‖134 must submit a PMN to EPA at least 
ninety days before manufacture.
135
  
The PMN is supposed to include basic data (such as the identity of 
the submitter and of the chemical substance), the anticipated 
production volume, uses, exposures, and environmental fate.
136
 
TSCA does not require a manufacturer to test a new chemical 
substance before submitting a PMN, and the GAO reports that 
companies ―typically do not voluntarily perform such testing.‖137 
EPA has received about 40,000 PMNs since 1976, generally between 
1,000 and 2,000 each year.
138
 The CRS reports that about thirty-three 
percent of PMN submissions include test data on chemical properties 
and about fifteen percent include data on health effects.
139
 The 
submitter is supposed to submit any data within its possession or 
control that relate to the health or environmental effects of the 
chemical substance.
140
  
EPA generally is supposed to complete its review of PMN‘s 
within ninety days. During the ninety-day review, EPA assesses the 
risk associated with the substance and whether its manufacture, use, 
etc., may present ―an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.‖141 The GAO reports that, because of limited data, EPA 
often predicts potential exposure and toxicity of new chemicals 
through modeling and comparisons of chemicals with similar 
molecular structures for which data are available.
142
 The GAO 
 
 134. Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(B) (2006). For 
simplicity‘s sake, I do not discuss ―significant new uses‖ in the text. For background on EPA‘s 
treatment of such uses, see BERGESON, supra note 76, at 43–46. 
 135. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1) (2006). 
 136. 40 C.F.R. § 720.45–.50 (2009). 
 137. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 3. 
 138. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 9. 
 139. Id. at 10. 
 140. ―The PMN Form must be accompanied by test data in the submitter‘s possession or 
control relating to the health or environmental effects of the new chemical substance.‖ 
Hathaway et al., supra note 44, Part I at 10218. This information must include: ―health effects 
data, ecological effects data, physical and chemical properties data, environmental fate data, 
and monitoring and other data relating to human exposure or environmental releases.‖ Id. 
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 720.50(a)(2)). 
 141. Id. at 10215; BERGESON, supra note 76, at 21.  
 142. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 3. 
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indicates that, despite ―weaknesses‖ in assessment capacity, EPA 
believes that the models, information on other chemicals, and the 
information companies provide in their PMNs relating to production 
volume, anticipated uses, etc., enable the agency to conduct a 
―reasonable review of new chemicals.‖143 The GAO indicates that 
about twenty percent of the PMNs received each year go through a 
more detailed review process after they are screened initially because 
EPA is able to determine based on its screening models that such 
chemicals pose limited risks.
144
  
The GAO reports that, as of June 2005, EPA‘s new chemical 
reviews resulted in ―some action being taken to reduce the risks of 
over 3,500 of the 32,000 new chemicals that companies had 
submitted for review.‖145 The GAO elaborates that these actions 
ranged from chemical companies voluntarily withdrawing their 
notices of intent to manufacture new chemicals [for over 1,600 
chemicals], chemical companies entering into consent orders with 
EPA to produce a chemical under specified conditions [for over 
1,200 chemicals], and EPA promulgating significant new use rules 
requiring chemical companies to notify EPA of their intent to 
manufacture or process certain chemicals for new uses prior to 
manufacturing or processing the chemicals for such uses [for about 
570 new chemicals submitted for review].
146
 
 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. Id. at 12. 
 145. GAO November 2005, supra note 76, at 2. In its November 1, 2005, comments to 
GAO, EPA‘s OPPT indicates that the agency ―is proud of the progress [it] has made in 
protecting human health and the environment. . . . TSCA authority has provided the Agency the 
ability to review more than 40,000 new chemicals prior to introduction into the marketplace and 
we have restricted or otherwise regulated over 1,600 of these chemicals while a similar number 
have been withdrawn by the manufacturer, often in the face of EPA action.‖ The GAO notes 
that this does not include EPA‘s review of chemicals the agency had exempted from PMN 
requirements because EPA was satisfied the chemicals will not present an unreasonable risk. Id. 
at 2 n.4. TSCA authorizes EPA to exempt new chemicals from PMN requirements under a 
variety of circumstances. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(h)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h) 
(2006). Other exemptions are considered ―self-executing‖ and do not require EPA approval. See 
BERGESON, supra note 76, at 29–37. For example, EPA may approve an exemption from PMN 
requirements for a chemical substance that will be manufactured in low volume (―LVE‖) and 
does not present a serious risk to health or the environment. See 40 CFR § 723.50(a), (c), (d) 
(2009); BERGESON, supra note 76, at 37–40.  
 146. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 15–16. For a more in-depth review, see BERGESON, 
supra note 76, at 41–46; GAO November 2005, supra note 76, at 5. EPA has authority to take 
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As the ABA Basic Practice Series book on TSCA reflects, ―[i]n 
most cases, EPA reviews PMN submissions and does not elect to 
control the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of 
the new chemical substance.‖147 EPA‘s website indicates that 
―[a]lmost 90 percent of PMNs submitted to EPA complete the review 
process without being restricted or regulated in any way.‖148 After the 
ninety-day PMN period expires, the submitter may begin to 
manufacture the chemical substance without any restrictions.
149
  
The GAO‘s view is that the PMN process has produced limited 
benefits in terms of generating new data about new chemicals.
150
 It 
offers several possible reforms to TSCA to enhance the quality of 
information provided to EPA pre-manufacture, including: (1) 
requiring companies to test their chemicals and submit the results to 
EPA with their PMNs, while tying the need for such testing (and its 
extent) to various triggers, such as production volume (used in 
Canada and the European Union), or gaps in EPA information (e.g., 
to require testing where ―EPA‘s analysis models do not adequately 
predict toxicity‖151); and (2) perhaps shifting testing to the pre-
marketing time period rather than pre-manufacture stage since about 
half of the pre-manufacture notices EPA receives are for new 
chemicals that ―never enter the marketplace.‖152  
This issue of screening new chemicals is one of the significant 
areas of ongoing debate concerning TSCA implementation, as 
Professor Adelman notes.
153
 The CEQ offers a helpful summary of 
some of the options Congress considered, and its ultimate approach, 
in its report the year after TSCA was enacted:  
 
action (via a rule, order, or injunction) under § 5(f) if it determines that a new chemical 
substance presents or will present an unreasonable risk before EPA can issue a § 6 rule. See 
BERGESON, supra note 76, at 42–43; Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(f); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) 
(2006). EPA has used this § 5(f) authority rarely—as of 2000, EPA had issued only three such 
rules. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 43. 
 147. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 41.  
 148. U.S. EPA, Possible Outcomes of a PMN Review, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/new 
chems/pubs/possible.htm (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 149. BERGESON, supra note 76, at 41. 
 150. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 7. 
 151. Id. at 8. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Adelman, supra note 131. 
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 Enactment of the Toxic Substances Control Act in October 
1976 culminated nearly 6 years of executive and congressional 
deliberation. . . . 
During the 6 years it took to pass the law, controversy centered 
on how to assess potentially harmful chemicals before 
marketing. Some advocated positive clearance by the 
Environmental Protection Agency before any new chemical or 
new use for a chemical could be marketed. The opposing 
argument was that such a massive clearance procedure would 
create an impossible regulatory burden and might impede 
progress and beneficial use of chemicals. Some in industry 
wanted no premarket notification at all; others proposed 
notification only for groups of chemicals that had been 
officially designated as hazardous.  
 The Act as passed takes a middle position, requiring 
manufacturers of all new chemicals and chemicals for new 
uses to give EPA 90 days‘ notice before manufacture begins. 
Any chemical not listed on an inventory of existing chemicals 
will be considered new. Positive clearance for each new 
chemical is not required before marketing, but EPA can stop 
the manufacture, sale, or use of any chemical that may present 
an unreasonable risk.
154
 
Two decades ago, John Mendeloff identified the key issue for 
―screening‖ approaches as follows:  
In screening programs there is only one key policy issue: ―how 
high to set the standard of proof that firms have to meet to 
show that their products are not too risky.‖ On the one hand, 
―[i]f the standard of proof is set too high, many worthwhile 
products (some of which might even reduce risks) will be 
stillborn.‖ On the other if the standard of proof is ―set too low, 
too many hazardous products will be approved.‖ 155 
 
 154. 1977 CEQ Report, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
 155. MENDELOFF, supra note 3. 
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 On its website, EPA describes its new chemicals program under 
TSCA as ―one of the Agency‘s premier risk management programs,‖ 
which ―serves a key gatekeeper function.‖156 As the commentary 
reflects, and as Professor Adelman reviews in more detail,
157
 the 
question of whether the ―middle position‖ embodied in TSCA is the 
―right one,‖ or whether, in Mr. Mendeloff‘s terms, the standards are 
―too high‖ or ―too low,‖ has triggered substantial debate.158  
Before moving on to TSCA‘s regulatory authority under § 6, I 
offer one addendum to Mr. Mendeloff‘s take on the role of screening 
regimes. In addition to Mr. Mendeloff‘s point that the effectiveness 
of such regimes depends in part on where they set the bar, another 
possible feature involves the tools such regimes provide to facilitate 
learning. EPA‘s Sustainable Futures Program, which EPA launched 
in 2002 as a voluntary pilot project, is an example of this possible 
role for screening regimes.
159
 As the GAO notes, EPA‘s goal in the 
program is to ―help industry develop new chemicals that are 
sustainable economically and environmentally.‖160 EPA offers the 
following summary of the program on its website: 
 The Sustainable Futures (SF) Initiative is a voluntary 
program that encourages chemical developers to use EPA‘s 
models and methods to screen new chemicals for potential 
risks early in the development process. The goal is to produce 
safer chemicals more reliably and more quickly, saving time 
and money. This means getting safer chemicals into the market 
and in use. In some cases, it means providing alternatives to 
more risky chemicals—this is pollution prevention in its purest 
form.
161
  
Thus, EPA educates interested companies about the agency‘s 
screening protocols so the companies can use the protocols to screen 
 
 156. U.S. EPA, Reviewing New Chemicals, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ar/2007-2009/review 
newchem/index.htm (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 157. See Adelman, supra note 131.  
 158. See MENDELOFF, supra note 3, at 50. 
 159. Sustainable Futures—Voluntary Pilot Project Under TSCA New Chemicals Program, 
67 Fed. Reg. 76,282–76,286 (Dec. 11, 2002).  
 160. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 42; Sustainable Futures, 67 Fed. Reg. at 76, 282. 
 161. U.S. EPA, Sustainable Futures, Basic Information, http://epa.gov/oppt/sf/pubs/basic. 
htm (last visited May 18, 2010). 
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their chemicals. EPA suggests that such ―learning‖ approaches hold 
promise for producing a variety of benefits, including the following:  
 Identification and commercialization of safer chemicals, 
Increased Pollution Prevention (P2) opportunities, Increased 
innovation, More focused testing, More efficient processes, 
and Reduced generation of chemical waste. 
Avoiding problem chemicals and the potential high costs 
associated with those chemicals, sometimes called chemicals 
―left on the cutting room floor,‖ may well be the source of the 
greatest cost savings to companies participating in Sustainable 
Futures. The ultimate identification and commercialization of 
safer chemicals benefits the participant, as well as the general 
public and the environment.
162
 
D. Regulation under § 6 of TSCA 
A fourth key issue Congress faced in considering TSCA (in 
addition to its jurisdictional scope, information-gathering regimes for 
existing chemicals, and screening approaches for new chemicals) 
involved the type of legal regime it should establish to empower EPA 
to regulate chemicals in situations in which EPA concluded the 
chemicals posed a risk. In § 6 of TSCA, Congress gives EPA a broad 
range of tools to regulate chemical substances when EPA finds that 
there is a ―reasonable basis‖ to conclude that the chemical substance 
―presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
the environment.‖163 EPA‘s options include prohibiting the 
manufacture of the substance, limiting the amount that may be 
manufactured, only allowing particular uses and/or concentrations, 
requiring various types of warnings or other notifications, and 
requiring that manufacturers retain records of their manufacturing 
processes.
164
  
 
 162. U.S. EPA, Benefits to Sustainable Futures Graduates, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/sf/ 
pubs/benefits.htm (last visited May 18, 2010). 
 163. Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006). 
 164. Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(a)(1)–(6), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
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Congress established procedural requirements for EPA to follow 
in imposing controls. EPA must initiate a rulemaking proceeding to 
take action. The agency must include a statement that discusses: (1) 
the effects of the substance on health, and ―the magnitude of the 
exposure of human beings to such substance‖; (2) the effects of the 
substance on the environment and the magnitude of the exposure of 
the environment to such substance; (3) the benefits of the substance 
for various uses and the availability of alternatives to the substance; 
and (4) the ―reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the 
rule, after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small 
business, technological innovation, the environment, and public 
health.‖165  
Section 6 mandates that EPA pass rules that ―protect 
adequately,‖166 and that EPA use the ―least burdensome‖ of its 
options.
167
 In addition, § 6(c) provides that EPA should not act under 
TSCA to regulate a risk if the risk could be addressed under another 
federal law that EPA administers, unless EPA determines that it is in 
the ―public interest‖ for the Agency to regulate the risk under § 6.168 
TSCA directs EPA to compare the estimated costs of compliance and 
relative efficiency of acting under TSCA versus under a different 
statute.
169
 
The GAO observes that the TSCA § 6 framework described above 
creates a ―legal threshold that has proven to be difficult for EPA.‖170  
 
 165. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c). 
 166. Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). 
 167. Id. 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). See Toxic Substances Control Act § 9(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2608(b); see also Hathaway et al., supra note 44, Part I at 10207, 10208 (citing S. Rep. No. 
698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5–6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4495). Id. at 
10210 (―These exemptions reflect Congress‘ intent in enacting TSCA to impose controls on 
chemicals that are not adequately regulated under existing law, while avoiding the application 
of duplicative or overlapping regulations to those chemicals otherwise subject to pervasive 
regulatory oversight‖ (citing Inventory Reporting Requirements, 42 Fed. Reg. 64572, 64586 
(Dec. 23, 1977)). Materials that are ―pervasively regulated‖ under other federal legislation 
include ―pesticide[s], . . . tobacco . . . [nuclear] source material . . . special nuclear material, or 
byproduct material . . . firearms and ammunition . . . and . . . food[s], food additive[s], drug[s], 
cosmetic[s], and device[s].‖ Id. 
 169. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). 
 170. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 9. 
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EPA has had difficulty demonstrating that harmful chemicals 
pose an unreasonable risk and consequently should be banned 
or have limits placed on their production or use. In fact, since 
Congress passed TSCA nearly 33 years ago, EPA has issued 
regulations under the act to ban or limit or restrict the 
production or use of only five existing chemicals or chemical 
classes [the Agency has also placed controls on four new 
chemicals under § 5(f)]. Significantly, in 1991, EPA‘s 1989 
regulation broadly banning asbestos was largely vacated by a 
federal appeals court decision that cited EPA‘s failure to meet 
statutory requirements.
171
 
The courts have played an important role in the implementation of 
this framework. In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
172
 the Fifth 
Circuit held that EPA had not sufficiently considered and ruled out 
other, less burdensome alternatives before placing a total ban on 
asbestos.
173
 In addition, the court held that EPA needed to consider 
the extent to which substitute products were available.
174
 The GAO 
reports that after completing the 1989 asbestos rule challenged in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings, EPA has ―completed only one regulation to 
ban or limit the production or use of an existing chemical (for 
hexavalent chromium in 1990). Further, EPA has not completed any 
actions to ban or limit toxic chemicals under section 6 since the court 
rejected its asbestos rule in 1991.‖175 In sum, EPA has ―rarely 
 
 171. Id. at 10; GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that EPA has regulated five 
chemical substances or groups of chemical substances under § 6; and the ―last final action EPA 
took to control existing chemicals under section 6 was published in 1990.‖). The GAO also 
noted that, as of 2005, EPA has required companies to submit notices of any significant new 
uses for 160 existing chemicals, which provides EPA the chance to review risks the new use 
poses. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 27. For the CRS‘s summary of EPA‘s use of its § 6 
authority, see CRS Report, supra note 17, at 18. 
 172. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 173. Id. at 1229. 
 174. Id. at 1230. Section 2605 addresses a number of chemical substances in particular, 
such as PCBs and mercury, but I do not cover these substances here. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) 
and (f). Similarly, I do not address TSCA‘s authority to address imminently hazardous 
substances. 
 175. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 11. The GAO notes that state and some other 
federal actions have established controls for toxic chemicals outside the bounds of TSCA. Id.  
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banned, limited the production, or restricted the use of existing 
chemicals.‖ 176 
The GAO has identified several reforms to TSCA that the GAO 
believes would enhance EPA‘s ability to regulate dangerous chemical 
substances, including changing the current § 6 ―unreasonable risk‖ 
standard for regulating existing chemicals, relaxing judicial review, 
and changing the ―least burdensome‖ requirement.177 Again, 
Professor Adelman addresses this suite of issues in his Article.
178
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In its 2008 report, the CRS suggests that three key policies inform 
TSCA‘s approach to regulation of chemical substances: 
TSCA regulates potential risks of industrial chemicals in U.S. 
commerce, based on three policies: (1) Chemical 
manufacturers are responsible for testing chemicals to 
determine their potential effects on health and the 
environment; (2) EPA should regulate chemicals that present 
an unreasonable risk to health or the environment; and (3) 
EPA‘s implementation of the law should not create 
unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation.
179
 
 The CRS concludes that ―[f]ew have expressed concern about the 
last TSCA purpose,‖ but ―TSCA‘s progress in achieving the first two 
goals has been debated: where some see success, others see failure, 
and both sides of the debate point to EPA‘s history of implementation 
and its voluntary initiative for collecting data on high production 
volume chemicals in support of their views.‖180 
Now is a propitious time for this symposium issue on New 
Directions in Environmental Law to consider the important issues 
TSCA raises, not only for how the issues relate to environmental 
regulation generally, but also for how policymakers might consider 
their treatment of these issues in the context of TSCA itself. As 
 
 176. GAO June 2005, supra note 1, at 18.  
 177. GAO February 2009, supra note 85, at 11–12.  
 178. Adelman, supra note 131. 
 179. CRS Report, supra note 17, at Summary, 2. 
 180. Id. at Summary. 
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several commentators have suggested, reform may be on the table in 
the near future.
181
 This would be a marked departure from TSCA‘s 
first thirty-plus years, when Congress left its basic structure largely 
alone.
182
  
As I note above,
183
 my modest role in this symposium is to 
provide some of the contextual backdrop for TSCA‘s enactment and 
implementation; Professor Adelman‘s contribution provides a 
perspective concerning the changes needed in light of what we have 
learned. In closing, however, I stray briefly from my charge in order 
simply to highlight what strike me as some of the more interesting 
issues that would benefit from careful consideration. I list five such 
issues here.  
First, for a host of critical issues—e.g., what types of testing and 
other information gathering should be required under particular 
circumstances, and what types of limitations on manufacture, 
distribution, use, etc., are appropriate—the debate about possible 
TSCA reform presents a terrific opportunity for meaningful debate at 
a conceptual level about the meaning of the precautionary principle 
and the concept of sustainable development, hopefully in tandem 
with careful consideration of how they should be applied together to 
address real-world policy challenges. Each concept has proven 
difficult on its own to pin down. Efforts to consider the two in 
tandem are even less advanced. TSCA, REACH, and other 
 
 181. Greenwood, supra note 15, at 10034 (suggesting that ―[t]he time for TSCA reform is 
basically now or never.‖); CRS Report, supra note 17, at 1; Sachs, supra note 77, at 1818–23. 
The CRS suggests that there are competing views about the merits of reforming TSCA. CRS 
Report, supra note 17, at 35 (noting that ―[s]ome analysts, and most in the regulated 
community, believe that TSCA has performed as intended, and they support TSCA in its 
current form.‖). On the other hand, in February 2009, Cal Dooley, President of the American 
Chemistry Council, testified before Congress that ―there are several reasons why Congress 
should begin the effort to modernize TSCA.‖ Revisiting the Toxic Substance Control Act of 
1976: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 111th 
Cong. (2000) (statement of Cal Dudey, President, American chemistry Council). 
 182. As one former EPA official and current prominent practitioner puts it, ―TSCA is one 
of the oldest federal environmental statutes that has never seen substantial reform.‖ Greenwood, 
supra note 15, at 10034; see also CRS Report, supra note 17, at 1 (noting that ―[t]he basic 
TSCA provisions in Title 1 have never been amended.‖). For a list of the amendments Congress 
has enacted, see CRS Report, supra note 17, at 1 n.2. 
 183. See supra note 19. 
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initiatives
184
 seem intended to embrace each concept, yet their 
approaches are very different.  
Related, this debate about how to incorporate the precautionary 
principle and sustainable development into possible TSCA reform 
legislation ought to be expanded to grapple with the larger challenge 
of evaluating how best to ―manage‖ chemicals throughout their life 
cycle in a way that is both precautionary and sustainable. My guess is 
that there is even more support today than in 1976 for the adage that 
an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, and that we should 
be focusing on opportunities for pollution prevention, or ―front-end 
stewardship of chemical production and use,‖ in an effort to limit or 
minimize the need for pollution control and remediation.
185
 TSCA 
reform offers a chance to consider domestic experience under TSCA, 
the pollution control statutes, the reporting and remediation statutes, 
as well as experience under other countries‘ counterparts, to inform 
our thinking about how best to manage chemical substances in a way 
that is sustainable and precautionary. While there have been a 
number of efforts to grapple with the application of these ―precepts‖ 
of environmental law in particular contexts,
 186
 TSCA reform efforts 
present an opportunity for transparent consideration of how these 
concepts or principles should fit together in a TSCA-like regime that 
operates in tandem with statutes that focus on different aspects of 
chemicals‘ life cycles to produce effective public policy.  
A second, very different question that also has normative as well 
as procedural implications is: What role should TSCA carve out for 
the public and, more generally, for ―sunshine approaches‖ designed 
to enhance environmental protection? I did not have the space to 
explore this issue in detail. But the idea of incorporating such 
approaches as a part of the policy tool box has become increasingly 
popular in recent years,
187
 and it is an important one in the TSCA 
 
 184. For discussions of REACH and other approaches, see, e.g., Applegate, supra note 21; 
Sachs, supra note 77; U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO PROTECT 
AGAINST THE RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, GAO-07-825 (2007). 
 185. Hathaway et al., supra note 44, Part I at 10208. 
 186. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 21. 
 187. See David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for 
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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arena that already has engendered considerable debate.
188
 As noted 
above, because of the perceived paucity of data about possible risks 
from chemical substances, generation of risk-related information 
(about toxicity, risks of exposure, etc.) has long been a central goal of 
TSCA. Critics of TSCA complain about an ―information deficit‖ 
because of the lack of data and argue that addressing this deficit 
would, in addition to helping regulators regulate effectively, help 
businesses and consumers ―choose safer chemicals‖ and thereby 
improve efficient operation of the market.
189
  
Part of this issue involves determining appropriate parameters for 
dissemination of information.
190
 It is clear that other ―stakeholders‖ 
(states, etc.) could benefit in performing their responsibilities from 
access to information about chemical substances and their 
characteristics, including the possible risks they pose.
191
 Further, 
many commentators have suggested that there are other benefits to 
dissemination of information, including the incentives openness 
creates for ―regulated parties‖ to bolster protective practices (the TRI 
program has frequently been identified as a successful example in 
this respect), the signals it provides government to enhance its 
operations, marketplace benefits, and the added legitimacy it creates 
through a more informed citizenry. The CRS notes that ―EPA 
protects from disclosure the identities of as many as 90% of . . . new 
chemicals due to formal assertions by manufacturers that the 
information is confidential business information.‖192 In any reform 
effort, the balance TSCA currently strikes between openness and 
preserving confidentiality is likely to shift in the direction of greater 
openness because of institutional structure questions involving the 
role of the states (discussed below) and the impacts of globalization 
(also discussed below).
193
 Careful consideration of other benefits of 
 
 188. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 77. 
 189. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 21 (internal citation omitted). 
 190. Sachs, supra note 77, at 1826–32; Applegate, supra note 21, at 729. 
 191. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 15, at 10040 (suggesting that ―there is fairly broad 
support across the political spectrum for statutory change‖ that allows states access to chemical 
information so long as states are able to protect it from disclosure). 
 192. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 9 n.25 (also noting that the percentage ―drops to 65% 
for new chemicals that actually enter commerce‖). 
 193. Professor Sachs, for example, suggests that REACH is likely to have ―transnational 
effect[s]‖ in the realm of information disclosure. Sachs, supra note 77, at 1819. 
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reporting and transparency, discussed in the rich literature on the TRI 
program among other places, should be incorporated into discussions 
about this issue as well.  
Third, TSCA raises front and center another issue that has 
received considerable attention during the implementation of our 
environmental regulatory infrastructure, notably the appropriate roles 
for different types of strategies ranging from ―command-and-
control,‖ to ―market-based,‖ to ―voluntary.‖ As noted above, TSCA 
has relied extensively on voluntary initiatives. The experience under 
TSCA should be reviewed closely for insights about the possibilities 
for structuring approaches to incorporate a variety of regulatory, 
market-oriented, and voluntary strategies. Cliff Rechtschaffen and I 
have reviewed some of the track record of cooperative and coercive 
approaches in the compliance arena.
194
 The empirical and theoretical 
work we discuss, and additional contributions to these literatures (as 
well as literatures concerning voluntary and coercive approaches 
under environmental and other statutes), may be helpful in 
considering possible alignments of cooperative or voluntary and more 
coercive approaches as part of any TSCA reform.  
Fourth are questions concerning TSCA‘s institutional structure. 
Unlike most of the major environmental regulatory statutes (notably 
RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA), TSCA does not follow a 
cooperative federalism approach. Instead, the federal government has 
taken the lead in TSCA implementation.
195
 An obvious question is: 
how is this approach working out and, related, would other structures 
likely lead to better results? Given the experiences to date, both with 
TSCA and approaches adopted under other laws, and the nature of 
the challenges TSCA is intended to address, what insights should we 
glean from these experiences and how should these insights inform 
the structure Congress establishes for TSCA implementation as part 
of any reform initiative? Part of this inquiry will include review of 
the increasing number of state initiatives, such as California‘s Prop 
 
 194. We discuss this issue in the compliance arena in CLIFF RECHTSCHAFFEN AND DAVID 
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL 
PARTNERSHIP (2003). 
 195. See, e.g., CRS Report, supra note 17, at 6–7, 20–22 for discussion of TSCA‘s 
institutional structure and the role of the states in regulation of toxic chemicals. 
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65.
196
 Borrowing Justice Brandeis‘s famous phrase, it is important to 
consider states‘ roles as ―laboratories of democracy,‖197 as well as 
states‘ capacity as potential co-regulators, and possible ―marketplace 
imperatives‖ such as the economy of scale issues that have received 
considerable attention in connection with the Clean Air Act.
198
 The 
CRS, among others, has suggested that the expanding patchwork of 
state laws, and the possibility that some state laws may be ―less 
firmly based on sound science,‖ may lead manufacturers to support 
more uniform regulation at the federal level.
199
 Various 
commentators, including Mark Greenwood, have suggested that, 
particularly with increases in state capacity, interest, and action, it no 
longer is politically possible to ―design a chemical management law 
that ma[kes] only passing reference to the states.‖200 There is a rich 
literature about when and how best to allocate different levels of 
responsibility between the federal and state governments. This will be 
an important institutional structure issue for policymakers to consider 
as part of any initiative intended to reform TSCA.  
Finally, there is the question of what role initiatives outside the 
United States should and will play in TSCA reform. What incentives 
(and perhaps disincentives) will REACH and other non-U.S. 
initiatives create for particular TSCA reforms? The ―globalization of 
commerce‖ is likely to complicate efforts to administer TSCA in 
isolation from other regimes.
201
 Data information developed under 
one regime may well impact the need for data under another; multiple 
regimes inevitably will have implications for data transparency under 
each; and the existence of different approaches is similarly likely to 
influence choices of regulatory strategies to address problematic 
chemical substances (and the universe of chemicals for which 
companies are required to implement various types of controls). The 
 
 196. Roe, supra note 91, at 631–33 (discussing Proposition 65); CRS Report, supra note 
17, at 22 (noting an increase in state and local restrictions on chemicals). 
 197. David Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories 
of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. 
REV. 347(1994). 
 198. Applegate, supra note 21. 
 199. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 22. 
 200. Greenwood, supra note 15, at 10040–41. 
 201. CRS Report, supra note 17, at 22. 
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GAO, CRS, and a variety of commentators have tackled this issue 
over the past couple of years, and Professor Adelman covers it in 
detail in his Article, but I would be remiss not to at least mention the 
likely influence on TSCA of non-U.S. initiatives, and international 
agreements.
202
  
In tandem with Professor Adelman‘s much more in-depth 
treatment of some of these questions (and no doubt others as well), I 
hope the reader leaves the volume somewhat more informed about 
Congress‘s goals in enacting TSCA, with a bit better appreciation for 
some of the issues that have arisen during implementation of the 
statute, and also with a sense of some of the framework questions that 
should be on the table during discussions about TSCA reform and 
about possible revisions to our environmental legal infrastructure 
more generally. 
 
 202. See, e.g., U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: 
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO PROTECT 
AGAINST THE RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS, GAO-07-825 (2007); CRS Report, supra note 17, at 
22–24; Applegate, supra note 21; Sachs, supra note 77, at 1819 (contending that ―[c]hemical 
regulation in the United States is now being transformed . . . through the transnational effects of 
foreign legislation‖). 
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